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The paper analyzes a very stylized model of crises and demonstrates how the degree of 
strategic complementarity in the actions of investors is an important determinant of fragility. 
It is shown how the balance sheet composition of a financial intermediary, parameters of the 
information structure (precisions of public and private information), and the level of stress 
indicators in the market impinge on strategic complementarity and  fragility. The model 
distinguishes between solvency and liquidity risk and characterizes them. Both a solvency 
(leverage) and a liquidity ratio are required to control the probabilities of insolvency and 
illiquidity. It is found that in a more competitive environment (with higher return on short-
term debt) the solvency requirement has to be strengthened, and in an environment where the 
fire sales penalty is higher and fund managers are more conservative the liquidity requirement 
has to be strengthened while the solvency one relaxed. Higher disclosure or introducing a 
derivatives market may backfire, aggravating fragility (in particular when the asset side of a 
financial intermediary is opaque); the regulator should set together disclosure and prudential 
policy. The model is applied to interpret the 2007 run on SIV and ABCP conduits. 
JEL-Code: G210, G280. 
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1. Introduction 
In a crisis situation, and the present financial crisis is a good example, things seem to go 
wrong at the same time and an adverse shock is magnified by the actions and reactions of 
the investors.1 In particular, liquidity evaporates while short-term investors rush for the 
exit, and a solvency problem may arise. The increased reliance on market funding of 
financial intermediaries, investment banks in particular but also commercial banks, has 
been blamed for the increased fragility. The demise of Northern Rock in 2007, and Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 2008, or of the German IKB or Hypo Real State, are 
cases in point where the short-term leverage of the institutions was revealed as a crucial 
weakness of their balance sheet.2 In this context it has proved difficult to disentangle 
liquidity from solvency risk. The influence of the opaqueness of financial products, the 
impact of public news (such as those provided by the ABX index on residential-based 
mortgage securities, public statements about the health of banks3, or stigma associated to 
borrowing from the discount window which becomes known4), as well as the stabilizing 
or de-stabilizing influence of derivative markets are also debated. The crisis has put 
regulatory reform in the agenda. Policy makers and regulators are struggling with how to 
reform capital requirements, introduce liquidity requirements, and control markets for 
derivatives. 5 
 
                                                 
1   See, for example, Brunnermeier (2009) and Krishnamurthy (2009). 
2   For example, in June 2007 wholesale funds represented about 26% of liabilities in Northern Rock 
(Shin (2009)) and short term financing represented an extremely high percentage of total liabilities in 
Lehman Brothers before the crisis (Adrian and Shin (2010)). Washington Mutual faced a withdrawal 
of $16.5 billion of large deposits just in the two weeks before its collapse (according to the Office of 
Thrift Supervision). See also the evidence in Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010).  
3   Such as the case of the run on IndyMac Bancorp in June 2008 which followed shortly after the public 
release of letters by Senator Schumer of the Banking Committee.  
4   See Armantier et al. (2010). 
5   See, for example, FSA (2009) and BIS (2009). The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) introduces a leverage 
limitation for financial holding companies above a certain size. BIS (2009) proposed two new liquidity 
ratios: a liquidity coverage ratio to cover short term cash outflows with highly liquid assets and a net 
stable funding ratio to cover required stable funding with available stable funds. It is worth noting that 
Bear Stearns was regulated by the SEC and was in fact subject to a liquidity requirement which proved 
ineffective in the crisis.   3
The recent financial crisis has reopened the debate on whether crises are fundamentals or 
panic-driven. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in their analysis of the Great Depression 
argued forcefully that many bank failures arose out of panics, that is, because of liquidity 
rather than solvency problems. This would be consistent with the self-fulfilling view of 
crises of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Gorton (1988) disputed the 
view that crises are panic driven with a study of crises in the National Banking Era 
concluding that crises were predictable (see also Gorton (1985) and Schotter and 
Yorulmazer (2009)). The information view of crises has been developed, among others 
by Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), and Allen and Gale 
(1998).6 Calomiris and Mason (2003) dispute also the analysis of Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963) and conclude that some episodes of banking crises in the 1930s in the US can be 
explained by deteriorating fundamentals while others could be explained by a panic 
component dominating (as the crises in January and February of 1933). Starr and Yilmaz 
(2007) claim that both fundamentals and panic elements coexist in the explanation of the 
dynamics of bank runs in Turkey. 
 
In this paper a model that bridges the panics and fundamentals view of crises is presented 
and it is shown how a worsening of some stress indicators may trigger a downward spiral 
by increasing strategic complementarity in the actions of investors and magnify the 
impact of bad news. The model disentangles liquidity from solvency risk and shows how 
their control needs both a solvency (leverage) and a liquidity requirement. It is found also 
that more transparency or adding a derivatives market may be counterproductive in terms 
of stability. This is particularly so when the asset side of a financial intermediary is very 
opaque. 
 
The paper presents a very stylized model of a crisis where investors have to decide 
whether to keep the investment or run. The investment may be in a currency, bank, or 
short-term debt. A financial intermediary will be our main focus. The degree of strategic 
                                                 
6   Postlewaite and Vives (1987) present a model with incomplete information about the liquidity shocks 
suffered by depositors featuring a unique Bayesian equilibrium with a positive probability of bank 
runs. In their model there is no uncertainty about the fundamental value of the banks’ assets and no 
solvency problems.   4
complementarity in the actions of investors, that is, how the actions of investors move 
together, is shown to be an important determinant of fragility. We characterize how the 
degree of strategic complementarity depends on the balance sheet composition of a 
financial intermediary, parameters of the information structure of investors (precisions of 
public and private information), and the level of stress indicators in the market. In the 
case of a financial intermediary, strategic complementarity increases with a weaker 
balance sheet (higher leverage) and with stress indicators such as the required return of 
short-term debt of the bank (competitive pressure) or the level of the fire-sale penalty of 
early asset liquidation. A weaker balance sheet or an increase in stress indicators raises 
fragility, the probability of a crisis, and the range of fundamentals for which there is 
coordination failure from the point of view of the institution attacked (that is, when the 
institution is solvent but illiquid). Moreover, the impact of bad news, say a public signal 
about weak fundamentals, is magnified when strategic complementarity is high. At the 
same time public signals, coming for example, from a derivatives market, may be 
destabilizing (over and above the strict content of the news), and the more so the more 
precise they are. The results are consistent with the 2007 run on SIV and ABCP conduits. 
 
The model is based on the theory of games with strategic complementarities with 
incomplete information (an example of which are the “global games” of Carlsson and van 
Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998); see Vives (2005)).7 We provide a general 
framework, which nests among others the models of Morris and Shin (1998, 2004), 
Rochet and Vives (2004), and Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011). Our framework displays 
the link between strategic complementarity and fragility  (by showing how the degree of 
strategic complementarity is the crucial parameter to characterize equilibrium and how 
strategic complementarity relates to the deep parameters in the model); delivers 
predictions both in the case where there is a unique equilibrium and where there are 
multiple equilibria; and characterizes illiquidity and insolvency risk and show how do 
they depend on the composition of the balance sheet of a financial intermediary. We 
typify how a regulator to control the probabilities of insolvency and illiquidity has to set 
                                                 
7   The importance of strategic complementarities in macro models has been highlighted by Cooper and 
John (1988).    5
solvency and liquidity requirements; and apply the model to interpret the 2007 run on 
SIVs and the role of a derivatives market. 
 
The policy message that follows from the analysis is that a regulator, with the tools 
available, needs to pay attention to the composition of the balance sheet of financial 
intermediaries, in particular to the ratio of cash to unsecured short-term debt and to the 
short-term leverage ratio (ratio of unsecured short-term debt to equity or, more in general, 
stable funds). Those two ratios, together with the required return of short-term debt and 
parameters of the information structure, are crucial determinants of the probabilities of 
insolvency and illiquidity. Often minimum ratios on solvency (inverse of short-term 
leverage) and liquidity will be sufficient to control the probabilities of insolvency and 
illiquidity. It is found that in a more competitive environment (with higher return on 
short-term debt) the solvency requirement has to be strengthened, and in an environment 
where the fire sales penalty increases and fund managers become more conservative the 
liquidity requirement has to be strengthened while the solvency one relaxed. The 
introduction of a derivatives market should go together with tightened regulation. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and examples. 
Section 3 characterizes equilibrium and its links with strategic complementarity. Section 
4 analyzes illiquidity and insolvency risk and develops the comparative statics properties 
of equilibrium. Section 5 deals with solvency and liquidity regulation of a financial 
intermediary and Section 6 with the literature connections and evidence. Section 7 
applies and extends the model to the 2007 run on SIV. Section 8 considers other 
applications. Concluding remarks close the paper. The Appendix collects the proofs of 
the propositions.  
 
 
2. The investors’ game and a stylized crisis model 
Consider the following binary action game among a continuum of investors of mass one. 
The action set of player i is  01 {,} , with  1 i y   interpreted as “acting” and   0 i y   “not   6
acting”. To act may be to attack a currency, refuse to roll over debt, run on a bank or SIV 
or not renew a certificate of deposit in the interbank market. 
 
Let  
1 1 i y ,y;     and   
0 0 i y ,y;     where  y  is the fraction of investors 
acting and   is the state of the world. The differential payoff to acting is 
10 0 B     if   y h;    , and 
10 0 C      if    y h;    , where   h;    
is the critical fraction of investors above which it pays to act and   will be an index of 
vulnerability or stress (with  0 h  ). We have that 
 
    y h;        y h;     
10      0 B    0 C    
 
Let C(B C)    be the critical success probability of the collective action such that it 
makes an agent indifferent between acting and not acting. This is the ratio of the cost of 
acting to the differential incremental benefit of acting in case of success in relation to 
failure. An investor will “act” if his assessed probability of successful mass action is 
larger than . It is assumed that    h   is strictly increasing, crossing 0 at   

 




) and 1 at   

, and smooth on   ,   

.8 A larger   means more 
vulnerability or a more stressful environment for the institution attacked since the 
threshold for the attack to be successful is lower. In the applications h will be linear in  
in the relevant range: 
        01 h; h h        

 for   

  




                                                 
8   Note that this allows the function   h   to be discontinuous at   

 with   0 h  

 and 
 0 h   for   

.    7
The investors’ game is of strategic complementarities since 
10     is increasing in y .9 
It follows from these payoffs, if the state of the world is known, that if   

 then it is a 
dominant strategy to act; if     then it is a dominant strategy not to act; and for 
 ,   

  there are multiple equilibria. Both everyone acting and no one acting are 
equilibria. Since the game is a game of strategic complementarities there is a largest and a 
smallest equilibrium. That is, there are extremal equilibria. The largest equilibrium is 
1 i y   for all i if     , and 0 i y   for all i if    , and it is (weakly) decreasing in 
 . This is a consequence of 
10     being decreasing in  . 
 
From now on I consider an incomplete information version of the game where investors 
have a Gaussian prior on the state of the world   
1 N,   
   and investor i observes a 
private signal  ii s    with Gaussian i.i.d. distributed noise  
1 0 i N,   
  .10 It is 
worth noting that the prior mean     of   can be understood as a public signal of 
precision   . With this interpretation as a conditional expectation of   for a given 
realization of a public signal,    can be negative. 
 
The model encompasses several crisis situations studied in the literature: currency attacks 
(Morris and Shin (1998)), loan foreclosure (Morris and Shin (2004)), credit freezes 
(Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011)), and bank runs (Rochet and Vives (2004)). We 
concentrate in the latter and examine the other examples in Section 8. Traditional bank 
runs were the outcome of massive deposit withdrawal by individual depositors. Modern 
bank runs are the outcome of non-renewal of short-term credit in the interbank market, 
                                                 
9   In a game of strategic complementarities the marginal return of the action of a player is increasing in 
the level of the actions of rivals. This leads to best replies being monotone increasing. See Vives 
(2005). 
10   This is referred to in the literature as a “global game”.  Those games were introduced by Carlsson and 
van Damme (1993) as games of incomplete information with types determined by each player 
observing a noisy signal of the underlying state. The goal is to select an equilibrium with a perturbation 
in a complete information game with multiple equilibria. The basic idea is that players entertain the 
“global picture” of slightly different possible games being played. Each player has then a noisy signal 
of the game being played.   8
like in the case of Northern Rock, the 2007 run on SIV, or the 2008 run by short-term 
creditors in the case of Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers. 
 
The paper develops now an application to bank runs which fits in the general framework 
introduced. Consider a market with three dates:  0 1 2 t, ,  . At date  0 t  , the bank has 
own funds E  (taken to include stable resources: equity, long-term debt and even insured 
deposits) and uninsured short term debt (e.g. uninsured wholesale deposits, certificates of 
deposit (CDs)) in amount  0 1 D  . These funds are used to finance risky investment I  
and cash reservesM . The balance sheet constraint at  0 t   is thus  0 ED IM   . The 
returns  I   on these assets are collected at date  2 t   and if the bank can meet its 
obligations, the short-term debt is repaid at face value D, and the equityholders of the 
bank obtain the residual (if any).  Investors are also entitled to the face value D if they 
withdraw in the interim period  1 t  .  Let mM D   be the liquidity ratio,  DE    be 
the short-term leverage ratio, and  0 dD D   the return of the short-term debt. 11 
 
A continuum of fund managers makes investment decisions in the short-term debt 
market. At  1 t   each fund manager, after the observation of a private signal about the 
future realization of  ,   decides whether to cancel ( 1 i y  ) or renew his position ( 0 i y  ). 
If  y M   then the bank has to sell some of its assets12 in a secondary market to meet 
payments. The early sale value of the assets of the bank involves a fire sales penalty 
0    (retrieving only   1     for each unit invested).13 
                                                 
11   The distinction of stable funds within liabilities is made also in the BIS (2009) document dealing with 
liquidity risk. The two ratios proposed in the BIS document are in fact equivalent in our simple 
formulation. The BIS short-term funds ratio would correspond to mand the BIS net stable funds ratio 
to  EI . Note also that leverage   DDE   equals 
1 1 1
    and is monotone in . 
12   Or borrow against collateral in the repo market.  
13   The parameter    could be related to the Libor-OIS spread (a measure of the difference between 
interbank rates and the rates paid on instruments which are not exposed to the default risk of 
intermediaries) which increased substantially both in August 2007 (start of the crisis) and September 
2008 (Lehman Brothers’ collapse). In case of secured collateral   relates to the haircut required. 
Haircuts on asset backed securities rose dramatically after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (see, e.g., 
Gorton and Metrick (2010)). It is important to remark that the liquidity requirements on broker-dealers 
in the US were related to unsecured funding while, for example, the demise of Bear Stearns in the end   9
A fund manager is rewarded for taking the right decision (that is, withdrawing if and only 
if the bank fails). The cost of canceling the investment is C  and the benefit for getting 
the money back or canceling when the bank fails is  ˆ B BC   . Again,  C( B C)    is 
likely to be small since B C   is the benefit to make the right decision. What is crucial is 
that investors/fund managers, whatever the reason, adopt a behavioral rule of the type: 
cancel the investment if and only if the probability that the bank fails is above threshold 
 . This rule will arise also if investors expect a fixed return when withdrawing, nothing 
if they withdraw and the bank fails, and there is a (small) cost of withdrawing. Note that a 
larger    is associated to a less conservative investor. Risk management rules may 
therefore influence  .14  
 
Let    
11 1 DMI m d m 
     

, using the balance sheet constraint, be the 
solvency threshold of the bank15, such that if   

 the bank fails even if all fund 
managers renew credit to the bank; and   1    

 the “supersolvency” threshold, 
such that a bank does not fail even if no fund manager renews his CDs. Under these 
conditions the bank fails if  
 
11 dm







for   

,  and   h   is set to be negative if   

. Here we have that   0 hm  

. 
We can denote the critical fraction by    h;   identifying   with  , d  or  since h is 
decreasing in these variables.  (See Figure 1.) If 
11 10 d
    , noting that 
                                                                                                                                                 
happened because of its failure to renew its secured funding. (See SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and 
Related Entities (SEC, 2008).) 
14   The degree of conservatism of investors is an important determinant of short-term lending behavior 
according to the review of Krishnamurthy (2010) of debt markets during the crisis. 
15   It is worth noting that the solvency threshold is related to what the FDIC calls the “Net Non-core 
Funding Dependence Ratio”, as part of the CAMELS assessment, computed as non-core liabilities, less 
short-term investments divided by long-term assets.    10
   
11 1 sign m sign d 
     

, we can let also 
1 m 
   since then h is increasing 
in m  (despite the fact that  1 0 hm   ).16    
 
 
Figure 1. The function     
11 1 hm dm   
    

  in the bank runs model. 
 
In the balance sheet of a financial intermediary typically we have 
11 10 d
    . 
Indeed, the ratio of (uninsured) short-term debt over stable funds (equity, long term debt 
and insured deposits)  DE    is below 1 for commercial banks, and although it is above 
1 for investment and wholesale banks typically 
1 9 d.
   (with an interest rate of at most 
10%), and therefore we would need 
1 1 .
    or  10   to have 
11 10 d
    .  See 
Figure 2.  17 For a typical SIV we have also that  1   .18 We assume henceforth, unless 
otherwise stated, that 
11 10 d
    .  
 
                                                 
16   We have that  
1 10 hm  




     implies 
that  1  

. 
17   Only State Street Corp. would go above  10    with 14.77    (which would yield 
11 10 d
     
with an interest rate of 7.26%). Lehman Brothers had  3.76    at the end of 2007 (derived from 
Adrian and Shin (2010)).  
18   According to the Global Financial Stability Report of the IMF (April 2008), the typical funding profile 
of SIV in October 2007 was 27% in asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and the rest in medium-
term notes and capital notes. This would mean that  34 .   .   11
 
 
Figure 2: Short-term leverage ratio of US banks at September 30, 2008:  DE   , D = Deposits 
(Uninsured) + Short Term Debt + Other Liabilities, E = Equity + Long Term Debt + Deposits 
(Insured). Source: Veronesi and Zingales (2010), (data for Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
as of 08/31/2008). 
 
An alternative interpretation of the bank model would be to consider the aggregate 
banking sector of a country with   being a macroeconomic fundamental, with the 
investors being those outside the banking sector. In this interpretation the ratios are the 
aggregate ratios, we abstract from any externalities among banks, and a crisis is a crisis 
of the banking sector. 
 
 
3. Equilibrium and strategic complementarity 
In this section we study equilibria of the investors' game and the factors influencing the 
degree of strategic complementarity. The following proposition provides the equilibrium 
characterization and generalizes the results in Morris and Shin (2004) and Rochet and 
Vives (2004). The proof is standard and provided in the Appendix for completeness. Let 




   12
Proposition 1.  Let  C( B C)   .  
(i) An equilibrium is characterized by two thresholds   s, 
   with s
 yielding the signal 
threshold below which an investor acts and  ,  
    


  the state-of-the-world critical 
threshold, below which the acting mass is successful.  The probability of a crisis 
conditional on ss
   is  .  
(ii) There is a critical   0 01 h,   such that  
 

 for    0 hh  

,  and for   0 hh  

 we 
have that  
 

 and then the equilibrium is unique if   1 2 h     . If    h   is 
linear and  1 2 h     , then there is a range of   for which there are three 
equilibria. 
 
In order to gain some intuition into the structure of the game and the result let us think in 
terms of the best reply of a player to the (common) signal threshold used by the other 
players. Let   ˆ Ps , s be the conditional probability that the acting players succeed if they 
use a (common) threshold ˆ s when the player considered receives a signals (and denote 
by   the standard Normal cumulative distribution). We have that  
   





   

              
, 
where   ˆ s   is the critical   below which there is success when players use a strategy 
with threshold ˆ s ( ˆ s   

 if        ˆ sh     

, otherwise  ˆ s    is the solution 
in   of     0 ˆ sh       , which is increasing in ˆ s). It is immediate then that 
0 Ps   and  0 ˆ Ps .   Given that other players use a strategy with threshold ˆ s, the 
best response of a player is to use a strategy with threshold 
* s  where  
* ˆ Ps , s   : act if 
and only if   ˆ Ps , s    or, equivalently, if and only if 
* ss  . This defines a best-
response function in terms of thresholds 
  








     13
We have that     0 ˆ r ' Ps Ps     and the game is, indeed, of strategic 
complementarities: a higher threshold ˆ s by others induces a player to use also a higher 







  .  
This ensures that    r   crosses the 45º  line only once and that the equilibrium is unique. 
Note that r' is increasing in     since   ˆ 's   is independent of   . A sufficient condition 
to have multiple equilibria (necessary also for regular equilibria for which   1 ˆ r' s  ) is 
that   1 r' s   for   rs s  .  
 
In consequence, a necessary condition for multiple equilibria is that strategic 
complementarity be strong  enough; a sufficient condition is that strategic 
complementarity be strong  enough at relevant points (candidate equilibria). Indeed, 
when strategic complementarity is moderate always then there is a unique equilibrium, 
when it is not there may be multiple equilibria (see Figure 3). When    0 hh  

 and  1 h  is 
large enough there is a unique equilibrium. In the linear case, for an intermediate range of 
 , as  1 h  decreases we have multiple equilibria (generically three), and if  1 h decreases 
further we go back to  a unique equilibrium since then strategic complementarity is strong 
in an irrelevant range (see Figure 3).19  
                                                 
19   A similar situation arises with movements in  , but then the best reply moves vertically (with 
 1 2 h     , for example, when   10 h  ,  1    ,  5    ,  5    and 
 159 ., ., .   ). 
   14
 
 
Figure 3: Possible best responses of a player to the threshold strategy ˆ s  used by rivals for an 
intermediate range of  . The lower (upper) branch corresponds to  1 h  high (low), the 
intermediate to  1 h  intermediate. 
 
The strength of the strategic complementarity among the actions of the players depends 












which is increasing in 
1
1
- h  and in   , and decreasing and then  increasing in    (with 
r' as  0     and  1 r'  as     ).20 Note that   1 r'  if and only if 
 1 2 h     . The degree of strategic complementarity will be higher  whenever 
h  is less sensitive to  (larger 
1
1
- h ) and/or the prior is more precise (   large) and/or 
signals more imprecise (   low). When 
1
1
- h  is large a change in fundamentals  changes 
little the critical threshold   h  . This implies that a change in the strategy threshold ˆ s 
used by other investors leads to a larger optimal reaction since the induced change in the 
conditional probability that the acting investors succeed is larger. When noise in the 
signals is large a player faces little uncertainty about the behavior of others and the 
                                                 
20   It is easily checked that      
1 12 2 1 l sign r ' sign h         
     , in particular 
0 r'     for       .   15
strategic complementarity is increased. In the limit cases      (or, equivalently, a 
diffuse prior  0    ), investors face maximal strategic uncertainty (then the distribution 
of the proportion of acting players  y   is uniformly distributed over   01 ,  conditional 
on i ss
  ). In contrast, at any of the multiple equilibria with complete information when 
 ,   

 , investors face no strategic uncertainty (e.g. in the equilibrium in which 
everyone acts, an investor has a point belief that all other investors will act). 
 
In the bank runs model maximal strategic complementarity among investors is increasing 
in   
11 1
1 hd m 
     . That is, strategic complementarity is more likely to be higher 
with higher short-term leverage , face value of short-term debt d , or fire sales penalty 
 . Interestingly, strategic complementarity will tend to be higher when the liquidity ratio 
is higher but recall that if 
11 10 d




4. Illiquidity risk and insolvency risk  
This section characterizes coordination failure, liquidity and solvency risk, and how they 
depend on the stress indicators and parameters of the information structure. To do so it 
develops the comparative statics properties of equilibria, both when the equilibrium is 
unique or multiple, and works out the implications in the examples considered.   
 
 4.1. Coordination failure, illiquidity risk, and insolvency risk 
At equilibrium with threshold 
, there is a crisis when 
  . In the range   ,  
  
  there 
is coordination failure from the point of view of investors, because if all of them were to 
act then they would succeed. In the range   ,  


  there is coordination failure from the 
point of view of the institution attacked. In the bank model in the range   ,  


 the bank   16
is solvent but illiquid, that is, the bank would have no problem if only investors would 




The risk of illiquidity is therefore given by    Pr  
 

 and the risk of insolvency by 
   Pr      

. The latter is the probability that the bank is insolvent 
when there is no coordination failure from the point of view of the bank. The overall 
probability of a “crisis” is        Pr     
   .  Note that 
     Pr Pr Pr    
     

. A crisis occurs for low values of the 
fundamentals. In contrast, in the complete information model there are multiple self-




4.2. The comparative statics of risk 
The comparative statics results that follow hold when the equilibrium is unique, and 
when there are multiple equilibria for the extremal equilibria (the largest and the 
smallest). Furthermore, the results hold for any equilibrium, even the middle unstable 
one, if out-of-equilibrium adjustment is adaptive. With best-reply dynamics at any stage 
after the parameter perturbation from equilibrium, a new state of the world     is drawn 
independently and a player responds to the strategy threshold used by other players at the 
previous stage. Then a parameter change that moves monotonically the best reply will 
induce a monotone adjustment process with an unambiguous prediction. For instance, if 
we are at the higher equilibrium of the middle branch in Figure 3, a decrease in   may 
induce a movement to the lower branch and best reply dynamics would settle at the  
                                                 
21   As argued by Rochet and Vives (2004) this provides a rationale for a Lender of Last Resort 
intervention with the discount window. 
Insolvency                Illiquidity          Supersolvency
                    
                   

                 
*                  17
unique (and lower) equilibrium.22 The following proposition states the results (see the 
proof in the Appendix) and generalizes the comparative static results in the literature to 
multiple equilibria situations and extends them to the stress indicator  . The 
comparative statics results are not restricted to parameter configurations where the 
equilibrium is unique as in the received literature.  
 
Proposition 2. Comparative statics. Let    0 hh  

. At extremal equilibria (or under 
adaptive dynamics):  
(i)  Both 
,  s
and the probability of crisis    P  
   are decreasing in   (i.e., 
with less conservative investors) and in the expected value of the state of the 
world    , and increasing  in stress indicator . 
(ii)  A release of a public signal     has a multiplier effect on equilibrium 
thresholds (i.e. over and above the impact on the best response of an investor), 
which is enhanced if     is higher.  
(iii)  If     is low enough (bad times) then a more precise public signal 
increases
,   P  
   and the range   ,  


 while a more precise private 
signal reduces it. If     is high enough (good times), the results are reversed. 
 
Remark 1: The range of fundamentals   ,  


for which there is coordination failure and 
illiquidity (from the point of view of the institution attacked) is decreasing in   and may 
increase or decrease with  . When    h   is linear,  0 0 h    and  1 0 h     (as in 
the bank model except when  m   ) then the range increases with  . 
 
Remark 2: The region of potential multiplicity   1 2 h     is enlarged with an 
increase in payoff complementarity (decrease in  1 h ) and/or an increase in the precision of 
the public signal in relation to the private one      . 
 
                                                 
22   See Echenique (2002) and Vives (2005).   18
Remark 3: The global comparative statics analysis in Proposition 3 allows to ascertain the 
impact of a discrete change of parameters which change the equilibrium set. For example, 
a large increase in the degree of strategic complementarity (say a large decrease in  1 h ) 
may imply that we go from a situation with a unique equilibrium with a low signal 
threshold for action and low critical threshold 
*   to one with a high signal threshold for 
action and high 
*   (see Figure 3, where for an intermediate decrease in  1 h  we have three 
equilibria). In the bank run example this could arise, for instance, because of a sudden 
increase in the fire-sale penalty   inducing a large increase in fragility and bank crashes. 
 
Releasing more public information is not necessarily good according to result (iii). To 
start with it will not be good if fundamentals are weak (    low enough).  In this case a 
more precise public signal is a coordinating device for investors to act (attack) since each 
one knows that others will put more weight to the public signal. The effect is reinforced 
with a lower precision of private information since then the value of the public signal is 
enhanced. (Note that strategic complementarity is maximized for high     and low    .) 
The opposite happens when fundamentals are good. Furthermore, a public signal, which 
becomes common knowledge, has the capacity to move the market to a higher threshold 
equilibrium with a higher probability of a crisis (see Section 6 with the ABX index as a 
public signal).  
 
 
5. Liquidity and solvency regulation of financial intermediaries 
Consider the bank run model where      
11 1 hm d m   




11 1 md m 
    

.  We present first in the following corollary the comparative 
static results of risk and deal secondly with regulation. 
 
Corollary 1: In the bank run model there is a critical liquidity ratio   01 m,   such that 
for mm  ,  
 

 and  
 

 for mm  . Assume 
11 10 d
     and mm  . Then:    19
  The probability of insolvency    Pr   

 is decreasing in the liquidity ratio m  
and in the expected return on the bank’s assets    , increasing in the short-term 
leverage ratio   and the face value of debt d , and independent of  the fire-sales 
penalty  , and the critical withdrawal probability  . 
  The probability of failure    Pr  
   (and the critical 




  are decreasing inm ,  , and    , and increasing in  ,  , and 
d . The probability of illiquidity    Pr  
 

 is decreasing in   and 
increasing in   and .  
 
The limit case where     allows for a closed-form solution. Then it is easy to see 
that  
  11 0
1




         
 
and  1 m  .23 When  1 m  , both 
 and  
 

 are decreasing in   and in m  
(provided that 
11 10 d
    ), and increasing in  , , and d . 
 
The following table summarizes the results. Note that the qualitative comparative statics 
of the probability of failure and of the range of illiquidity are identical.  
 
                                                 
23   Note that in this case  
*   is independent of    and    .   20
Table 1.  Comparative statics of solvency and liquidity risk with the liquidity ratio m , the mean 
of   ,    , the short-term  leverage ratio  , the return of the short-term debt d , the fire-sale 















An increase in balance sheet stress (lower m  whenever 
11 10 d
     or higher ),  or 
market stress (higher d , the return of deposits, which can be interpreted as an increase in 
competitive pressure, or higher  , the level of fire-sales penalty for early liquidation, or 
lower , more conservative investors), increases fragility. Fragility also increases with 
worse fundamentals (lower    ) and more precise public information (higher    )  when 
fundamentals are bad according to Proposition 2. In all the situations with the exception 
of changes in     and m  the increase in fragility goes together with an increase in the 
degree of strategic complementarity. An increase in the liquidity ratio makes an attack 
less likely (whenever 
11 10 d
     since then 0 hm  ) despite that it increases the 
degree of strategic complementarity.  
 
Let us turn now to regulation in the bank runs model and how the likelihood of crises can 
be controlled. 
 











(Range of illiquidity) 
m   (-) (-)  (-) 
    (-) (-)  (-) 
  (+) (+)  (+) 
d   (+) (+)  (+) 
   0 (+)  (+) 
   0 (-)  (-)   21
Two common objectives of regulators are the control of the probabilities of insolvency  
and of illiquidity (see, e.g., Freixas and Rochet (2008)). The control of potential 
insolvency is grounded typically on the excessive incentives to take risk on banks with 
limited liability. The control of illiquidity is grounded on alleviating fragility and the 
coordination problems in the financing of banks and is connected directly with our 
model. In short, the second objective tries to avoid that a solvent institution fails and the 
first is the prudential requirement that provides a lower bound for solvency. The liquidity 
concern can be addressed with the lender of last resort facility of a central bank or by 
liquidity regulation. In the present paper we will assume those objectives for the regulator 
which will use as instruments leverage and liquidity requirements. 
 
Suppose thus that the regulator wants to control the maximum probabilities of insolvency 
q and of failure p , and therefore the probability of illiquidity. This is possible using 
liquidity and leverage ratios. If the regulator wants that p q   then from Corollary 1 this 
can be done setting mm   and inducing  
 

. In general this will be too costly, 
because of the reduction in the level of investment in the risk asset, and the regulator will 
set p q  .  
 




*   is the largest equilibrium) are decreasing in m  and 
1   , 
we can make sure that   Pr q   

 and    Pr p 
    choosing  m  and 
1    large 
enough so that 
 
1
q q      
 





p p      
  .                                              (L) 
 
The boundaries of both constraints can de shown to be linear and downward sloping in 
the space  
1 m,
   provided that 
11 10 d
    : 
 
            
11 11 1 qq dm 
     










     

 .                     (L) 
 where   01 k,   is a function of  p ,  and       (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4: Solvency (S ) and liquidity (L) constraints to control probabilities of insolvency and 
crisis with a short-term leverage ratio ( D E   ) and a liquidity ratio (mM D  ).  
 
 
We have, therefore, that the regulator can control the maximum probabilities of 
insolvency  q and of a crisis p , and therefore the probability of illiquidity, by an 
appropriate induced choice of liquidity m  and leverage  ratios. The regulator has to 
propose therefore a region in 
1 m,
   space where the ratios of a bank have to lie. This 
region is limited by a kinked downward sloping schedule reflecting the (partial) 
substitutability between 
1  and  m
   (Figure 4).  The bank will choose then the least cost 
combination
1 m,
   which will necessarily lie on the frontier of one of the constraints. It 
is worth noting that often there will be no loss of efficiency if the regulator sets minimum 
levels for
1 m,
   given the kink in the constraint set. This is so since the optimization of 
the financial intermediary will lead to the kink in the constrained set for an ample range 
of given prices for liquidity and capital. The minimal  
1 ˆ ˆ m,
  ratios will be given by the   23
intersection of the boundaries of the solvency and the liquidity constraints. When  0    
the two constraints collapse into one and in equilibrium  
 

. If we require  p q  , 
then  ˆ mk   and we can control q with a requirement on 
1   . 
 
The following Result provides a summary of the main conclusions of our analysis while  
Proposition 3 provides the technical statement of the results (see the proof in the 
Appendix). 
 
Result.  Let 
11 10 d
    .  Then to control for the probabilities of insolvency and of a 
crisis the regulator has to act on the partially substitutable solvency 
1    and liquidity m  
ratios.  The minimal regulatory ratios  ˆ m and 
1 ˆ    move in opposite directions in response 
to parameter changes: The liquidity requirement  ˆ m has to be increased and the solvency 
one 
1 ˆ    decreased with increased fire-sales penalty  , more conservative fund managers 
1 
 , and better fundamentals    , as well a more precise public information     under 
certain conditions. More funding pressure for intermediaries calls for an increased 
1 ˆ    
and a constant  ˆ m .  
 
Proposition 3.  Let 
11 10 d
    .  Then:  
(i) To control for the probabilities of insolvency (q) and of a crisis ( p ) both a solvency 
(S) and a liquidity (L) linear constraints, acting on the partially substitutable ratios   
1 and m
  , have to be fulfilled.  
(ii) The solvency constraint S becomes tighter when  d  increases and is independent of 
  and  . The liquidity constraint L becomes tighter when d ,    increase or    
decreases. Both constraints are more relaxed with a higher    , while (provided 12 p  ) 
a higher     has a relaxing effect on S and an ambiguous effect on L.  
(iii) There is a constant   01 k,   (increasing in p , decreasing in , and with ambiguous 
dependence on      ) such that the minimal regulatory ratios for liquidity and solvency 
are, respectively,   24

1









          
    
 and    
11 11 1 qq ˆ ˆ dm 
     

. 










 then  0 ˆ km   and the comparative statics of the regulatory 
ratios is given in Table 2.   When     we have that  1 k    .  
 
Table 2. Comparative statics of regulatory ratios when  pq  , and  k   not too small. 
 




(+) (-)  0  (+)  (+)* 
1 ˆ  
 
(-) (+) (+) (-) (-)* 
                                  *Provided  12 p  , and either   or     small enough and  p   . 
 
A higher return on short-term debt d  will increase the solvency requirement and leave 
unaffected the liquidity requirement. This is so since both constraints are tightened in a 
vertical way when  d  increases (see Figure 5.a). A higher fire sales penalty   and more 
conservative investment managers (lower  ) will increase the liquidity requirement and 
decrease the solvency one. This is so since those changes do not affect the solvency 
constraint and tighten the liquidity constraint (see figures 5.b and 5c.). This means that in 
a more competitive environment (higherd ) the solvency requirement has to be 
strengthened, and in an environment where   is high and   is low the liquidity 
requirement has to be strengthened while the solvency one relaxed. It is worth to remark 
that intermediaries with higher funding costs (higherd ) should have a higher solvency 
requirement and the same liquidity requirement.  
 
An increase in return prospects     calls for a higher liquidity requirement and a lower 




 is decreasing in     and therefore L is relaxed relatively less than S, implying that 




) and  
1 ˆ    decreases with     (since k is   25
independent of    ). The same is true for an increase in     in the case     (for which 
1 k  ). (See Figure 5.d.) In general, a sufficient condition for L to be relaxed less 
than S (if at all) when     increases is that k  increases with     (and this happens if     is 
small enough and  p   ) . Then  0 ˆ m      and 
1 0 ˆ
 
    . It is also possible that 
0 ˆ m    and increasing     leads to decreases in both regulatory ratios.24 
 
The results imply that the regulator should set together disclosure and prudential policy. 
This is so since prudential requirements depend on the level of the precision     of the 
public signal. For example, when  12 p  , and either   or     is small enough and 
p    (with very conservative investors), we have that  ˆ m  increases and  
1 ˆ    decreases 
with    . Requiring more disclosure has to go together then with an increased liquidity 
requirement and a decreased solvency one. As we will see in Section 6 introducing a 
derivatives market may imply that a public signal of high precision becomes available 
and this should be taken into account by prudential regulation. 
                                                 
24  For example, when  2 1 2 9 21 11 p . , q . ,  . ,  . ,  d .       , we have that  0 ˆ m      for a wide 
range of     and    .   26
Figure 5.a 
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Remark 4: It is worth exploring what happens in the extreme case when 
11 10 d
    . 
Banks with intense investment banking or wholesale activity have 
1 10
   , since 
DE    is generally above 1, and therefore 
11 10 d
     becomes possible.  If   
leverage is high enough, and 
11 10 d
    , then  0 m   

, 1  

,  and   
0
* m      if    or   are small. In this case increasing the liquidity ratio leads to a 
higher likelihood of insolvency and crisis. Suppose that the regulator requires that  1 q  

 
(assume also that 
1 1 0 q d 
  





    ). We have then that the 
solvency constraint is upward sloping, and the liquidity constraint will be also upward 
sloping if  1
*
p   .  If the liquidity constraint is downward sloping then the potential 




p m, , k d 
      and    
11 ˆ ˆ m, m,
   . If both constraints are 
upward sloping then only the first choice survives. This means that when 
11 10 d
     it may be optimal (to keep the probabilities of insolvency and illiquidity 
under control) to induce the intermediary to choose to keep no liquid reserves and just 
impose a leverage limit. In short, for a very highly leveraged institution it is better not to 
keep liquid reserves.  
 
 
6. Literature connections, empirical implications, and evidence  
Previous literature has obtained results related to the ones presented and a growing body 
of evidence is consistent with them. Let us deal with both issues in turn. 
 
6.1. Received results 
Chang and Velasco (2001) in a model of financial crisis in emerging markets in the 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) tradition find that financial liberalization increases the 
expected welfare of depositors but may increase also fragility. In Matutes and Vives 
(1996), in a model which combines the banking model of Diamond (1984) with a 
differentiated duopolistic structure à la Hotelling, an increase in rivalry does increase the 
probability of failure in an interior equilibrium of the depositor’s game where banks have   29
positive market shares.25 Cordella and Yeyati (1998) find that disclosure of a risk 
exposure of a bank (which is not controlled by the bank manager) may increase fragility 
by increasing the deposit rates demanded by investors. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) also 
show how increasing the deposit rate increases the probability of a run of depositors in a 
model of the global games type.   
 
According to result (iii) in Proposition 2 public information has a coordinating potential 
beyond its strict information content as in Morris and Shin (2002). Every player knows 
that an increase in     will shift downward the best replies of the rest of the players and 
everyone will be more cautious in acting. This happens because public information 
becomes common knowledge and affects the equilibrium outcome. Gala and Volpin 
(2010) show how public information may be welfare damaging by correlating the 
investment decisions of agents and exacerbating the negative externality that one 
borrower imposes on others in the presence of credit rationing.  
Morris and Shin (2009) also study how insolvency risk and illiquidity risk vary with the 
balance sheet composition of a financial institution in a model where future fundamental 
uncertainty interacts with the strategic uncertainty of the present. In their model there 
would be no illiquidity risk if there was no future insolvency risk (ex post uncertainty) 
since it is assumed that partial liquidation of assets has no long run effect. The authors 
show that illiquidity risk is (i) decreasing in the ratio of cash plus interim realizable assets 
to short term liabilities; (ii) increasing in the "outside option ratio" (opportunity cost of 
the funds of short run debt holders); and (iii) increasing in the ex post variance of the 
asset portfolio ("fundamental risk ratio"). The results and the broad message of the paper 
are consistent with ours: regulation needs to pay attention to the balance sheet 
composition of a financial intermediary. 
 
Several negative feedback loops may aggravate a crisis. For example, in the bank crisis 
model, the fire-sales penalty will be related to adverse selection. Vives (2010) shows how 
the asset fire-sale penalty is increasing in the noise in the signals of the bidders and in the 
                                                 
25   Winton (1997) highlights the role of diversification.    30
amount auctioned, and decreasing in the number of bidders. In a crisis scenario it is 
plausible to expect noisier signals, an increased amount auctioned, and fewer bidders. All 
this will mean that when the bank tries to sell more assets because it is in distress it will 
face a larger discount, and this, in turn, will induce more sales to face the commitments, 
and further discounts. In the extreme the market may collapse because adverse selection 
is very severe in relation to the number of bidders. Similar phenomena may happen with 
the face value of debt since when a bank in distress needs refinancing it will be offered 
worse terms, and this aggravates in turn the fragility of the bank.26  
 
It is worth mentioning also that liquidity requirements may have unintended 
consequences aggravating adverse selection and drying up markets for liquidity 
(Malherbe (2011)). The reason is that when intermediaries hoard liquidity their selling 
behavior is suspicious that they want to get rid of lemon assets. Perotti and Suarez (2011) 
study how liquidity requirements and Pigouvian taxes can help internalizing the systemic 
externality induced by the short-term funding of intermediaries.  
 
The presence of large players and market power may introduce further issues. In the 
interbank market example market power may either facilitate liquidity provision (because 
liquidity is a public good and then sound banks may have an incentive to provide 
liquidity to a bank in trouble to avoid contagion (Allen and Gale (2004), Sáez and Shi 
(2004)) or may impede it (as banks with surplus funds underprovide lending strategically 
to induce fire-sales of bank-specific assets of needy intermediaries (Acharya et al. 
(2010)).27  
 
The literature has also found strategic complementarities in the decisions of individual 
banks that correlate their decisions to force the central bank to bail them out collectively. 
                                                 
26   See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for a model of a liquidity spiral combining market and funding 
liquidity, and Bernardo and Welch (2004) for a model where the fear of having to liquidate assets after 
a crisis may contribute to the frenzy by incentivating sales in the middle of the run. See also Eisenbach 
(2010) for a feedback model of short-term debt and rollover risk with endogenous fire-sale penalties. 
Liu and Mello (2011) explain how the fragile capital structure of hedge funds, due a coordination 
problem in redemptions, limits their arbitrage capabilities.  
27   See also Corsetti et al. (2004, 2006) for other effects of the presence of large players.   31
Farhi and Tirole (2012) show how private leverage choices of financial intermediaries 
display strategic complementarities through the response of monetary policy. This makes 
optimal for banks to adopt a risky balance sheet. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) show 
how the regulator has ex post incentives to bail out failed banks when many fail. This 
provides incentives to banks, particularly small ones, to herd in their investment policies 
and increase the risk of collective failure. 
 
6.2 Empirical implications and evidence 
The model has a rich array of empirical implications. To start with it is a model 
consistent with crises being driven both by fundamentals and panic components. It 
predicts also the presence of a multiplier effect of public information, which is increasing 
in its precision. Table 1 provides testable predictions that link the probability of failure 
and of insolvency of intermediary with the strength of fundamentals (   ), balance sheet 
ratios (m  and ), and market stress parameters ( ,   and  d   ). We have that the strength 
of strategic complementarities among investors, with its associated multiplier effect on 
comparative statics, increases with ,  and  d  .  
 
There is evidence that in banking crises are driven by both solvency and liquidity issues. 
Gorton (1988) in his study of crises in the US National Banking Era (1865-1914) 
concluded that panics were triggered when the "fundamentals" (a leading indicator of 
recession) reached a certain level. Calomiris and Mason (2003) find that some episodes 
of banking crises in the 1930s in the US can be explained by deteriorating fundamentals 
while others are open to being interpreted as the panic component dominating (as the 
crises in January and February of 1933). Starr and Yilmaz (2007) study bank runs in 
Turkey and conclude that both fundamentals and panic elements coexist in the 
explanation of the dynamics of the crises. Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) find in an 
experimental study that the severity of bank runs depends on the fundamentals (the state 
of the economy).  
 
Identifying and estimating strategic complementarities is not an easy task since the 
strategic aspect must be disentangled from responses of investors to common shocks.   32
Chen et al. (2010) identify strategic complementarities in mutual fund investment by 
relying precisely on the fact that illiquid funds (those with a higher fire sales penalty  in 
our model) generate larger strategic complementarities for investors than liquid ones 
since redemptions impose larger costs in the former funds. Hertzberg et al. (2011)) use a 
natural experiment with a credit registry expansion in Argentina to identify 
complementarities. 
 
Consistently with result (ii) in Proposition 2, there is experimental evidence that bank 
runs occur less frequently when banks face less stress (a lower   in our model) in the 
sense of a larger number of withdrawals being necessary to induce insolvency (Madies 
(2006) and Garratt and Keister (2009)). There is also evidence of the multiplier effect of 
public information (Proposition 2 (iii)) in the credit registry expansion in Argentina 
(Hertzberg et al. (2011)) and with discount window stigma (Armantier et al. (2011), 
Acharya and Merrouche (2010)). The latter refers to the reluctance of banks to borrow 
from the discount window because of fear that the bad news will become publicly known. 
Armantier et al. (2011) find that during the crisis banks borrowed from the Term Auction 
Facility, in which the borrowing bank is one of many, at higher rates than those available 
at the discount window, and that this spread was increasing with more stressed conditions 
in the interbank market. The spread indicates how much a bank is willing to pay to avoid 
the release of a public bad signal. This is consistent with the result of having a higher 
publicity multiplier associated to a higher fire sales penalty   in the interbank market. 
Consistently with the results in the Corollary 1 among the 72 largest commercial banks in 
OECD countries, those which relied less on wholesale funding, and had higher capital 
cushions and liquidity ratios, fared better during the crisis (in the sense of having smaller 
equity value declines and being subject to less government intervention, see Ratnovski 
and Huang (2009)). Finally, Fahlenbrach et al. (2011) find that banks with more short 
term funding performed worse both in the 1998 (as a result of Russia’s default on its 
debt) and in the 2007 crises. 
 
 
   33
7. An interpretation of the 2007 run on SIV 
A slowdown in house prices and tightening of monetary policy led to increasing doubts 
about subprime mortgages that were reflected in a sharp decline in 2007 in the asset-
based securities index ABX. This index had been launched in January 2006 to track the 
evolution of residential mortgage-based securities (RMBS). The index is a  credit 
derivative based on an equally weighted index of 20 RMBS tranches, and there are also 
subindexes of tranches with different rating, for different vintages of mortgages. The 
ABX index has provided two important functions: information about the aggregate 
market valuation of subprime risk, and an instrument to cover positions in asset-based 
securities, for example by shortening the index itself (Gorton (2008, 2009)).28 The 
decline in the ABX index during 2007 seems to have played a major role in the unfolding 
of the crisis and the run on SIV and ABCP conduits in particular. Indeed, at the end of 
2006 sub-indexes for triple-B securities moved somewhat downward after trading at par, 
and dropped dramatically in 2007 (see Figure 6).29  Something similar happened to the 
CMBX, a synthetic index corresponding to the ABX including 25 credit default swaps on 
commercial mortgages.  
  
Figure 6: Prices of the 2006-1, 2006-2, 2007-1 and 2007-2 vintages of the ABX index for the 
BBB- tranche. (Source: Gorton (2008).) 
 
                                                 
28   In fact, trading in the ABX indices (by Paulson & Co. and by Goldman Sachs) has delivered two of the 
largest payouts in the history of financial markets. See Stanton and Wallace (2011) who argue also that 
ABX prices are imperfect measures of subprime security values. 
29   The index starts trading at par except in the case of the 2007-2 index which opened significantly below 
par.   34
These indexes were highly visible and had a strong influence on markets and the 
evolution of the indexes went together with a sequence of bad news on subprime 
mortgages (bankruptcies and earning warnings for originators, downgrading of ratings for 
RMBS bonds and CDO –collateralized debt obligations, and large losses for hedge funds) 
from January to August 2007. The accumulated bad news in the ABX indexes culminated 
in the panic of August 2007 when BNP Paribas froze a fund because of a complete 
evaporation of liquidity in some segments of the US securitized market. A spike in the 
overnight spread in ABCP as well as in the Libor-OIS spread followed and the ABCP 
outstanding plummeted.  
 
The runs began on ABCP conduits and SIV which had some percentage of securities 
backed by subprime mortgages.  These vehicles were funded with short maturity paper 
and the run amounted to investors not rolling over the paper. While for a typical SIV, 
ABCP liabilities were 27% of the total at the end of 2007, for a typical conduit they were 
at 100%.30 Those vehicles need not have a high proportion of assets directly 
contaminated by the subprime mortgages but they had a large indirect exposure through a 
large share of assets issued by the financial sector. As short-term financing dried up, bank 
sponsors intervened and absorbed many of these vehicles onto their balance sheets. 31 It is 
important to distinguish between the conduits which were motivated by regulatory 
arbitrage, and which were fully insured by large commercial banks, and those motivated 
by risk transfer off balance sheet considerations. There is little scope for investor strategic 
complementarities in the first but substantial in the second. Correspondingly, there was a 
larger decline in ABCP conduits of the second type relative to those of the first type 
starting in August 2007.32  
 
Consider the following time line in the basic banking model. At time  0 t   mortgage 
loans are awarded and securitized.  At   0 t    a SIV is formed and holds I  loans and M  
                                                 
30   See the Global Financial Stability Report of the IMF (April 2008). 
31   See Acharya and Schnabl (2010) and Covitz et al. (2009) for evidence on the runs in the ABCP 
market. 
32   See Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2011).   35
reserves financed by equity E  and short-term debt (CDs) 0 D . At  12 t   a public signal 
p  about   is released. At  1 t   each fund manager, after receiving a private signal about 
,   decides whether to cancel ( 1 i y  ) or renew his CD ( 0 i y  ). At  2 t   the returns  I   
on the RMBS assets are collected, if the bank can meet its obligations, the CDs are repaid 
at their face value D, and the equityholders of the SIV obtain the residual (if any).  
 
 
The public signal P  may be the value of the ABX index or the price of a derivatives’ 
market with RMBS as underlying asset. Denote by   its precision. In the simplest 
scenario neither the SIV nor the fund managers in the short-term debt market participate 
in the derivatives market. In this case the introduction of the ABX index implies a 
discrete increase in the public precision together with (public) bad news. This will lead to 
a higher probability of a crisis, a higher
, both because of the direct effect of bad news 
(  EP   low) and of increased public precision (with    EP   low).  
 
A high level of noise in the signals will push in the same direction also (Proposition 2 
(iii)). Recall that a lower     increases strategic complementarity when     is already low 
(the maximal slope of   r   tends to infinity as 0    ).  Imprecise signals of SIV 
investors are likely given the opaqueness of the structured subprime products and 
distance from loan origination. 33 In this case we may expect     to be large also. The 
reason is that the precision of the signal of the fund managers (investors in the SIV)     
                                                 
33   See Pagano and Volpin (2009) for a model where issuers of structured bonds choose opaque ratings to 
enhance the liquidity of their primary market at the cost of diminishing (perhaps drastically) the 
liquidity of the secondary market. Wagner (2007) argues that financial development may incentivate 
banks to move into more opaque assets. 
     0 t   
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withI  RMBS 
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,  return on 
RMBS  unit 
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            1 t   
Funds managers 
receive private 
signal and decide 
on CD renewal   36
may be low (think of the German Landesbank investing in structured subprime products) 
and much lower than the precision of the private signals of the sophisticated traders in the 
derivatives market (think of investment banks such as Goldman Sachs or hedge funds 
such as Paulson&Co) which influence positively the public precision   (together with 
their risk tolerance).34  
 
The impact of the bad news is magnified when short-term leverage , the cost of funds 
d , and fire sales penalty   for early asset sales are high (all those factors make 
1
1 h
  and 
strategic complementarity high).  This was the situation in the crisis. In fact, the fire-sale 
penalties increased dramatically with the market becoming practically illiquid. Those SIV 
then had to be absorbed back by the parent banking institution. It is worth noting also 
that, according to Proposition 3 and Table 2, when     is low and investors are 
conservative (with  p   ) a higher precision of the public signal should lead to an 
increased liquidity requirement. That is, when the assets are opaque the introduction of a 
strong public signal like the one provided in a derivatives market should be accompanied 
with a tightened liquidity obligation.  
 
The presence of a derivative market may have other consequences. First of all, it may 
allow hedging the risk associated to the subprime products. This can be done by the SIV 
itself, by the fund managers with exposure to SIV by providing short-term financing, and 
by other investors with subprime exposure.35 The SIV by shorting the index may reduce 
exposure to subprime risk and increase reserves for potential non-renewal of CDs at  1 t   
at the cost of not profiting from the full appreciation potential of the subprime 
investmentI . If the SIV hedges completely its position then it is completely safe but the 
expected return is low, a partial hedge will increase the reserves to diminish the failure 
                                                 
34    See Angeletos and Werning (2006), Tarashev (2007), and Vives (Section 4.4, 2008) for related 
models. 
35   Public precision of the price in the derivatives market will decrease in the degree of risk aversion of 
informed investors in the market and in the sensitivity of the hedger demand to their endowment shock 
(Vives (Section 4.4, 2008)).    37
probability. Interestingly, the private information of the SIV hurts its hedging 
possibilities creating adverse selection in the derivatives market. 36 
 
 
8. Other applications 
We deal in this section with two more illustrations of our approach: a currency attack 
model and a credit freezes model.  
 
Currency attacks. A streamlined version of the currency attacks model of Morris and Shin 
(1998) where   represents the reserves of the central bank (with  0    meaning that 
reserves are depleted) fits our general model. Each speculator has one unit of resources to 
attack the currency ( 1 i y  ) at a cost C . Letting   
1 h;   
  , where  0    is the 
mass of attackers or 
1 
  the proportion of uncommitted reserves of the central bank, the 
attack succeeds if 
1 y  
  . Still   could be interpreted as the wealth available to a 
fixed mass of speculators. (See Figure 7a.) The capital gain if there is depreciation is 
fixed and equal to  ˆ B BC .  We have that  C(B C)     is likely to be small. 
 
                                                 
36   When the SIV has market power and precise information in relation to the prior, and the hedgers have 
a endowment shocks very correlated then the derivatives market dries up (Medrano and Vives (2004)). 
This is likely to be the case in a crisis situation.  
   38
 
Figure 7a. The function  
1 h;   
   in the currency crises model. 
 
In the range   ,  
  
  if currency speculators were to coordinate their attack then they 
would succeed, but in fact the currency holds. From Proposition 2 (i) we have 
immediately that the probability of a currency crisis is decreasing in the relative cost of 
the attack   and in the expected value of the reserves of the central bank    ; the 
probability of illiquidity   Pr  
 

 increases with   while the probability of 
insolvency   Pr   

 is unaffected by .37 
 
 
Credit market freezes. Consider the model of self-fulfilling freezes in credit markets of 
Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011).  This is a variation of the loan foreclosure model by 
Morris and Shin (2004)).38 In this case   are the fundamentals of the firms and  y   the 
                                                 
37   When  
1 h  
   we have always that  
 

 and   Pr  
 





 increases with  ).  
38   The loan foreclosure model is formally equivalent to the currency attacks model. Now  is the ability 
of the firm to meet short-term claims (where  0    means no ability). The action is to foreclose a 
loan. In this case   
1 h;   
   where  0    is the mass of creditors (or 
1 
  proportion of 
uncommitted liquid resources of the firm) and the project fails if 
1 y  
  . The face value of the loan 
is  L , the value of collateral (at interim liquidation) is   K L   and let  BK   and CL K . We 
have that  1 K L   .   39
proportion of banks not renewing credit to firms. Firms with good projects, at which 
banks can invest, have a return above the risk-free rate only if  





1   
  

 with  0    . Firms with bad projects return noting and banks can detect 
good projects from bad ones. The parameter   is to be interpreted as the inverse of the 
product of the mass of banks and a complementarity parameter that explains the 
performance of firms. We have that        h;       

 (see Figure 7b.) Note that 
in this case the increase in fragility,  0 h      , goes together with a decrease in 
the degree of strategic complementarity,  1 0 h   . The parameter 1    equals the 
ratio of the gross risk-free return to the gross return of good projects. The authors use the 
model to assess the responses of the government in the present financial crisis. The 
comparative static results in Proposition 2 apply. 
 
 
Figure 7b. The function       h;       

 in the credit market freezes model. 
 
 
9. Concluding remarks 
This paper presents a stylized model of a financial crisis which characterizes solvency 
and liquidity risk and highlights how the degree of strategic complementarity among 
                                                                                                                                                 
   40
actions of investors is a key parameter to understand fragility. The results characterize 
how market outcomes depend on the balance sheet structure (leverage and liquidity), 
market stress parameters (degree of competition, the fire sales penalty of early liquidation 
of investments), and the informativeness of public and private signals.  Fragility increases 
with balance sheet stress (short-term leverage, low liquidity, high return on short-term 
debt); with market stress (fire sales penalty, more conservative investors), and with the 
precision of public information when fundamentals are weak. A high degree of 
opaqueness on the asset side of a financial intermediary together with a strong public 
signal (say from a derivatives market) will increase the degree of strategic 
complementarity and potential fragility.  
 
The main general policy conclusion on regulatory reform is that a piecemeal approach 
will not work. The regulator will need to pay attention to the composition of the balance 
sheet of a financial intermediary and to the level of disclosure to control the probabilities 
of insolvency and illiquidity. In order to do so a leverage limitation and a liquidity 
requirement are needed, they are partially substitutable, and have to be set together taking 
into account the level of transparency. Indeed, in an environment with high market 
illiquidity and conservative investors the liquidity requirement has to be tightened while 
the solvency one relaxed; prudential constraints may have to be modified with higher  
disclosure levels (e.g. with stricter liquidity and relaxed solvency requirements). 
Competition policy and prudential regulation are not independent: In a more competitive 
situation leverage limits have to be strengthened.39 
 
The analysis has several important limitations. First of all, the balance sheet of the 
intermediary is exogenous and, correspondingly, the objectives of the regulator are also 
exogenous. Both could be endogenized introducing, for example, a moral hazard o 
commitment problem on the part of the intermediary which would rationalize the short-
term debt structure and indicate an optimal closure policy for the regulator.40 Second, the 
                                                 
39    This theme is developed in Vives (2011). 
40   See Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Diamond and Rajan (2000), Gale and Vives (2002) and Rochet and 
Vives (2004) for related approaches to the issue.   41
analysis is basically static while we are trying to capture dynamic phenomena.41 Third,  
the investors are symmetric42; and finally, the analysis focuses on a single institution or a 
consolidated banking sector and takes market parameters as given (e.g., the fire sales 
penalty); consequently, it does not take into account externalities among banks and 
systemic effects.43 These issues are left for further research. 
                                                 
41    See, for example, the dynamic analysis of panic debt runs in He and Xiong (2009). 
42   Steiner and Sákovics (2009) study a global game example where players are ex ante asymmetric.  
43   See Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) and Farhi and Tirole (2012).   42
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: The game is “monotone supermodular” (i.e., of strategic 
complementarities with a monotone information structure) since   i y ,y;    has 
increasing differences in    i y, y ,   , that is,  the differential payoff to act 
10    is 
increasing in  the aggregate action and the negative of the state of the world (y, )   , and 
signals are affiliated. This means that extremal equilibria exist, are symmetric (because 
the game is symmetric), and are in monotone (decreasing) strategies in type (Van Zandt 
and Vives (2007)).  Since there are only two possible actions, the strategies must then be 
of the threshold form:  1 i y   if and only if  i ˆ ss   where ˆ s is the threshold. It follows 
also that the extremal equilibrium thresholds, denoted s  and s , bound the set of 
strategies which are the outcome of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.  
If  ss   the game is dominance solvable and the equilibrium is unique. An equilibrium 
will be characterized by two thresholds   s, 
   with s
 yielding the signal threshold to 
act and 
 the state-of-the-world critical threshold, below which the acting mass is 
successful and an acting player obtains the payoff  0 BC   .  In equilibrium the fraction 
of acting players          y, s P r s s | s     
         must be no larger than 
the critical fraction above which it pays to act   









 and  1 h    . Furthermore, at the critical signal threshold the expected 
payoff of acting and not acting should be the same:  
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Pr | s B Pr | s ( C ) ;














     

               
, where  1 C( B C) .      
 
If     sh    
 

 then  
 

.  Otherwise,        sh    




. There is a critical    0 01 h,   such that for    0 hh  





and   
 

 for   0 hh  

. Since  
 

 when     
1 * sh    
 

 and by   43
replacing   








   

             
, it follows 







   
 
 
   
 
 . Let    0 hh  

, then equations (1) 
   sh    
    and (2) 




   

             
 combine into 
equation 
        
11 0
** * h             
      , 
by substituting the value of 
* s  from (1) into (2). This equation may have multiple 
solutions in 
*  . As      we have that     
1 h  
  tends to  and   ; as 
  

 we have that     hh   

 and    0   

whenever   0 hh  

. There is 




 . The solution will be unique if  0 '   ; there will be 
multiple solutions if   0 '     for a potential solution    0     (three in fact when 
 h   is linear, and two when there is a   such that    0     and   0 '    .). As   
tends to 0 (1) we have that   
1 
  tends to  (),  
* s  tends to (minus) infinity and 
*   tends to    (





 . There is 
a unique solution if   1 2 h     . Indeed, 
     
1 1 1 'h ' h      
   , where   is the density of the standard normal. 
Since   is bounded above by 12   and  1 h  is the smallest slope of    h  ,, it follows that 
'   is bounded above:  1 12 'h        (with strict inequality, except possibly when 
12 h    because then  
1 12 0 
   and   attains its maximum:   01 2    ). 
Therefore, if  1 2 h      then  0 '   . In this case the equilibrium is unique and 
the game is dominance solvable because thenss  . Furthermore, it should be clear that 
the critical thresholds 
*   and s
 move together. Suppose    h   is linear, then if 
1 2 h      there is a range of   for which there are multiple equilibria. Indeed, 
choose    such that   12
* h   , then    0
* '    and there must be three equilibria,   44
and by continuity there is a neighborhood of such   with multiple equilibria. Note that 
for  small we will have a unique equilibrium (high) and for   high a unique equilibrium 
(low) since as   tends to 0 (1) we have that   
1  
  tends to  () and     to  
() for any given   ,  
 

 . Given the shape of   (decreasing-increasing-
decreasing) for   small we obtain an equilibrium in the third decreasing portion and for 
  high an equilibrium in the first decreasing portion. ■ 
 







  .  
Proof: From the equation      ˆ (s ) h      we can solve for ˆ s as a function of   
and obtain         
1 1 ˆ sh         with derivative 
     
1
1 11 ˆ s' h' h   

  , where   is the density of the standard normal. 
Since   is bounded above by 12   and  1 h  is the smallest slope of    h  , it follows that 
ˆ s' is bounded below:  1 12 ˆ s' / h     . Hence,    
1
1 12 ˆ 's / h   

 , with strict 
inequality, except possibly when    12 h    because then   
1 12 0     and   attains its 
maximum:   0 12    . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  When    0 hh  

, the equation  
        
11 0
** * h             
       
determines 
. We obtain the results by looking at how parameter changes impinge on 
   . When  1 2 h     , we have that  0 '    and there is a unique equilibrium. 
The usual comparative static analysis applies. When  1 2 h      there may be 
multiple equilibria and the results will apply to the extremal ones. With adaptive 
dynamics the results apply in general.  
   45
(i) The result for 
*   follows since   is decreasing in   and    , and increasing in 
 since  0 h  . The threshold 
* s  moves with 
*  .44 The result for   P  
   is 
immediate for   and  , and for     also since increases in     move the distribution of 
  to the right. (ii) Suppose the equilibrium is unique. The equilibrium signal threshold is 
determined by   0
** rs ; s    . From which it follows that for  a marginal  change in 












whenever 1 r'   is met and  0 r'  . In consequence, an increase in     will have a larger 
effect on the equilibrium threshold s
 than the direct impact on the best response of a 
player  r        . The same is true for discrete changes even with multiple 
equilibria if we restrict attention to extremal equilibria or in general with adaptive 
dynamics. This multiplier effect is largest when r' is close to 1 at equilibrium, that is, 
when strategic complementarities are strong, and we approach the region of multiplicity 
of equilibria. This is so when     is large since r' is increasing in    . (iii) Let 
*   be the 




         




     
    . Note that 
*   is decreasing in     and therefore for low 
enough     (recall that     can be negative when interpreted as a public signal) we will 
have that 
*
    . Note that if 
*
     when     increases 
   Pr     
    also increases. For the second part, using the equation 
0
*    in      we obtain     
12 1 2
/ *
             
       . 
                                                 
44   The result for     follows also from a general argument in monotone supermodular games. We know 
that extremal equilibria of monotone supermodular games are increasing in the posteriors of the 
players (Van Zandt and Vives (2007)). A sufficient statistic for the posterior of a player under 
normality is the conditional expectation       E| s s            , which is increasing in 
  . It follows then that extremal equilibrium thresholds   ,s 
   increase with    .   46
It follows that  0     if 
*
     since  12   . Let 
*   be now the largest 
equilibrium. If     is large enough we have 
*
     and the results are reversed.  ■ 
 
Proof of Remark 1: When         01 h; h h       

,  0 0 h    , and 
1 0 h   ,   
 

 increases with    and decreases with  . Note that from 
        
11 0
** * h             
      , 
*  is increasing in   
and decreasing in . The result follows since  0 0 h    and  1 0 h    and therefore 
      01 h; h h       






   is increasing. ■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1:  From the proof of Proposition 1 it follows that the critical ratio m  






   
 
 
   
 
 where    
11 1 md m 
    

. 
(Note that the right hand side is decreasing in m  if  0 m   

, which obtains according 
to our maintained assumption 
11 10 d
    .) We have also that  0 d   

, 




is independent of and  .  We know also that   0 hm   (under the 
maintained assumption), 
1 0 h
     and 
1 0 hd
   . The results follow from 
Proposition 2 or by direct inspection of the equilibrium condition    0    . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
(i) We have that       Pr      

 and therefore the solvency constraint 
(S)   Pr q   

 holds if and only if  
1





11 1 md m 
    

. Furthermore,        Pr     
    (where 
*   
is the largest equilibrium) and therefore    Pr p 
    if and only if 

1 **
p p      
  . From Corollary 1 we know that the probability of 
insolvency is decreasing in m , 
1    and 
1 d
 . The cutoff 
*  and the probability of a crisis 
are decreasing in m , 
1    (and also in  , 
1 d
  and 
1 
 ). The constraint S follows   47
immediately from   
1
q q      
 

  yielding 
  
11 11 1 qq dm 
     

. Note that S is independent of   and  . The 
constraint L  follows from   
1 **
p p      
   noting that at the boundary 
 
















     

  where, from    0
*
p   , we obtain 








        
  





p p     
  . The constant k  is precisely the liquidity ratio which would 
eliminate the illiquidity region when it is required that  p q   and it is induced 
that
*   

. We have that    01 k,   is increasing in p , decreasing in  , and with 
ambiguous dependence on      . When     is small enough and  p   ,  k  is increasing 
in      . When    , 1 k  . 
 
Note that when 
11 10 d
     both constraints S and L are downward sloping since 
then we have  
11 1 10 qq d 
    









(ii) The constraints S and L become tighter when  d  increases. L becomes tighter when 
  increases (since  0 km   for interior solutions for m ) or    decreases (since k  is 
decreasing in ). Both constraints are more relaxed with higher     (for S since  q 

 is 
increasing in      and  1 m  , and for L since  0 k     and 
*
p   is increasing in   , 




p   provided that 12 p   since 
then   
11 0 qp 
  . This implies that increases in     relax S but have an 
ambiguous impact on L since k may increase or decrease with    . A sufficient condition 





decreasing in     and therefore L is relaxed relatively less than S.   48
(iii) The minimal 
1 ˆ ˆ m,
  ratios will be given by the intersection of the boundaries of the 
solvency   
   
11 11 1 qq dm 
     

 








     

  




































   
 
 and  
   
11 11 1 qq ˆ ˆ dm 
     

. 
It follows that  

1









          
    
 and if  p q   then  ˆ mk  . Note also that 










 then  0 ˆ km  . The comparative statics of the regulatory 
ratios given in Table 2 follow:  0 ˆ m   ,  0 ˆ m   ,  0 ˆ md  , 
1 0 ˆ 
    , 
1 0 ˆ 
    , and 
1 0 ˆ d
    . We have also that  0 ˆ m      since k is independent of 
  ,   0
*
pq     






and since 10 ˆ m  , we obtain that 
1 0 ˆ
 
     from  




0 ˆ m    . The same results hold for an increase in     in the case     (for which 
1 k  ) since    0
*
pq     

 and   
1 0 q  
  

 when  12 q  .  The same 
applies also if     is small enough and  p   . Then k  increases with     and  0 ˆ m    .  
It follows then also that 
1 0 ˆ
 
     since 
  
11 1 11 0 qq ˆ ˆˆ mm      
            

 as  




12 p  .■  49
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